We show that, if any classical errorcation(CE) and privicy amplification(PA) scheme used to distill the final key in the quantum key distribution is unsecure, it will cause contradicts in the pure classical case. Thus we draw the conclusion that all secure CE and PA are secure for the final key distillation in the quantum key distribution
Since Bennett and Brassard [1] suggested their quantum key distribution protocol(BB84 protocol) in 1984, the subject has been extensively studied both theoretically and experimentally. The protocol allows two remote parties Alice and Bob to create and share a secret key using a quantum channel and public authenticated communications. Intutively, the quantum key created in this way is in principle secure because eavesdroppers have no way to tap the quantum channel without disturb it. However, if the channel is noisy, we have to finad a secure way to correct the noise. More importantly, even in the case of noiseless channel, Eve may still obtain a small amount of information if indenpendent qubits rather than EPR pairs are used in the QKD protocol. So we still have to take certain privicy amplification scheme to increase the security so that the information leakage will be exponentially small. However, there are practical dificulties in doing so. The quantum error correction scheme in general requires EPR resources and quantum computers [2, 3] . If we use the classical EC and PA, we are worrying that Eve. may smartly choose the final meassurement basis according to the specific PA scheme [4, 5] . It has been shown recently that the classical CSS code is secure for the task to obtain secure final key [6, 7] . However, a practical difficulty still remains. The large CSS code could be difficult to decode. Also, a question naturally arises here is, whether there is any other secure classical EC and PA scheme in the quantum key distribution? In this letter, we show that, any classical PA scheme, if it is secure in the pure classical case, they must be also secure in quantum key distribution case.
Let us first consider the privicy amplification in noiseless case. We define the secure classical PA in pure classical case first. Suppose Alice and Bob share a classical n−bit key, N c . Eve. has a small amount of information I Ec to this key. A secure classical PA scheme A means that, after A is carried out, Alice and Bob will have a secure k−bit key( k < n) K c , to this K c , Eve's information is zero( or exponentially small). This also means the following axiom: Axiom: If Eve. has had an amount I Ec of information to N c already, then in any case if Eve has a nonneligible amount of information to K c , her information to N c must be larger than I Ec . Now we consider the noiseless channel QKD. We use the BB84 protocol to build up the raw key. After the meassurement to the qubits transmitted from Alice, Alice and Bob share a classical n−bit key N. However, here Eve. may have a state Ψ which is correlated with the raw key N. To show the security of scheme A here, we assume a supper Eve. This supper Eve. is stronger than the practically existing Eve. in that she can on the one hand know her state exactly on the other hand the state is still not disturbed. Or equivalently assuming she has many copies of Ψ, she can know Ψ exactly by meassuring some copies of Ψ. Of course, if a protocal is secure under this super Eve., it must be also secure under the practically existing Eve. In other phrase, if it is secure when Eve. has many copies of Ψ, it must be also secure in case Eve. only has one Ψ. Now Eve. has two properties related to the issue, one is the classical information to the raw key N. This classical information comes from her observation to many copies of Ψ. Suppose her information to the raw key N is I E . The other property of Eve. is the state Ψ. This super Eve. still keeps at least one copy of state Ψ. After Alice and Bob have completed scheme A, they share a final key K. The super Eve may, according to A, I and Ψ, produce and meassure a stae Ψ ′ which will maximize her information to K. Now we check what happens if the supper Eve. can have a nonneligible amount of information to the final key of the QKD with privicy amplification A. Suppose Alice and Bob adopt BB84 protocol to form their raw key. After that, they may estimate the upper bound of the correlation between their raw key N and Eve's state. We denote this upper bound for correlation as M. Note here M is the bound the Eve. can never reach with a higher than exponentially small probability ǫ. The specific value of ǫ is determined by Alice and Bob themselves, depending on the confidential level for the later communication task itself. After this, Alice and Bob may consider all possible state Eve. may have, the correlation between the state and the raw key N should be bounded by M. They choose the one that maximizes Eve's information I E to the raw key, provided she has many coppies of the state. We denote this state as Ψ. That is to say, Ψ 0 ∈ {ψ|Corr(ψ, N) ≤ M} (0.1) and
Here Corr(X, Y ) denotes the correlation between X and Y , I(N|x) means the maxmizes information to N, given x. Now they treat it as the pure classical case. They choose PA scheme A to form the final key K. Note A is dependent on the I E0 , in general, the larger the I E0 is, the shorter the K is. Also, one important fact here is that I E0 is Eve's maximal information given infinite coppies of Ψ 0 , this may be larger than Eve's information given only one coppy of Ψ 0 . However, if in Alice and Bob's detection, there is no error or only a very low error rate in the transmitted qubits, then the correlation upper bound M must be small therefore I E0 must be not too large. Now we see whether Eve. can have nonnegnigible information to the final key K in the above protocol. A supper Eve. may have many coppies of state Ψ bounded by certain correlation value M ′ ≤ M. This Eve. may obtain an amount of information I E for the raw key by optimally meassuring Ψ ⊗∞ . Suppose this I E is the maximal information Eve may obtain, given Ψ ⊗∞ .
And she can also keep or produce at least one copy of Ψ after ahe does the meassurement to obtain I E to the raw key N. Obviously we have
Thus, only with the classical information I E , Eve. has no way to have any information to the final key. However, this supper Eve. still has the state Ψ. After Alice and Bob complete scheme A, Eve. may take a further attack to obtain some information to the final key by using state Ψ appropriately according to the specific scheme A. Suppose Eve. can obtain some information on the final key from the attaking scheme S. According to the axiom, Eve's information to the raw key N must be larger than I E now. Then we find that, even Alice and Bob don't do any PA scheme, Eve, by herself can also imagine the PA scheme A for the raw key( one needs no information to the raw key itself in carrying out PA). Then Eve. use the same S to attack the imagined final key after A and finally obtain some information to the final key. Therefore, Eve. can always use this way to obtain a larger than I E amount of information to the raw key, even in the case Alice and Bob do nothing to the raw key. However, we have already assumed that I E is the upper bound of Eve's information to the raw key, given state Ψ ⊗∞ . Thus we conclude: A supper Eve. with infinite copies of Ψ cannot obtain any information to the final key after PA scheme A in BB84 protocol. Definite, a normal Eve. with only one copy of state Ψ cannot obtain any information either to the final key following the classical PA A in a QKD protocol.
The above result can be extended to the case of noisy channel very directly. Just before they take classical PA, Alice and Bob take classical error correction first. In doing so, they may leak some parity information to Eve. Suppose they have done the parity check m times. Then they just take the classical PA A ′ . A ′ is the secure classical PA when Eve's information is bounded by I E0 + m. Thus we have shown it is possible to take arbitrary classical error correction and privicy applicatio to quantum key distribution. However, we don't know how to quantitatively estimate M, the correlation given the tested error rate in the raw bits. We don't know how to estimate I E0 either. But when the tested error rate is very low, there must be an I E0 which is not too large. Suppose we have this value, we can immediately use arbitrary classical EC and PA to form the unconditional secure final key.
